RISKNET2 FINAL REPORT

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DISCLAIMER

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ACRONYMS

CSW	commercial sex worker
DoL	Dose of Love, RiskNet NGO in Borgas, Bulgaria
EC	European Commission
HESED	Health and Social Development Organization (Bulgaria)
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
IDU	injecting drug user
IfHF	Initiative for Health Foundation, RiskNet NGO in Sofia, Bulgaria
IGA	income generation activity
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation
KAP	knowledge, attitude and practice
LET	Life Quality Improvement Organization, RiskNet NGO in Zagreb, Croatia
MARP	most at-risk population
MSM	men who have sex with men
NGO	nongovernmental organization
POL	popular opinion leader
PSI	Population Services International, Inc., RiskNet2 partner organization
RDS	respondent-driven sampling
SMART	specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time bound
STI	sexually transmitted infection
SWOT	strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
UNGASS	United Nations General Assembly Special Session
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
XY	XY Association, RiskNet NGO in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RISKNET2 GOAL

The goal of RiskNet2 was to contribute to a reduction in HIV and STI (sexually transmitted infection) transmission and improve sexual health in select countries in Southeast Europe. This goal was achieved through the synergistic activities of technical and organizational capacity building. Technical capacity building increased the reach and effectiveness of interventions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that had expertise working with most at-risk populations (MARPs). While at the same time, organizational capacity building activities, new to the project in its second and final phase, contributed to the sustainability of the participating NGOs by supporting organizational development and providing management skills training in areas to enhance the organizations' ability to secure stable, long-term funding.

RISKNET2 ACHIEVEMENTS

Effectiveness of Outreach Services

RiskNet2 built the technical capacity of NGOs to implement international best-practice models to reach target groups with health products and information. Compared to contracted goals, most NGOs demonstrated strong performance, meeting or exceeding indicators by more than 20 percent. Where there were barriers to performance, organizational sustainability issues were identified and are discussed in the body of this report. The outreach and intervention models implemented by NGOs in this project include:

- *The Gatekeeper Reach model.* Using target group members to distribute condoms and recruit new clients, this model increased the number of clients served by NGOs. For example, between January and October 2006, the number of new clients registered with the network grew by 10 percent.

- *The Gatekeeper Effectiveness model.* By training informal leaders, i.e., gatekeepers, from target groups to encourage risk reduction behaviors among their friends, this model increased the number of clients of an NGO seeking HIV counseling and testing by 140 percent.

Building NGO Sustainability

Technical assistance focused on sustainability planning, skills building, and development of management tools and systems to improve the management of staff performance. This intensive effort included more than 213 person-days of training and consultancies. The results may be summarized as follows:

- At least five of the six NGOs have developed sustainability plans that will assure their continued ability to thrive for at least the medium term.

- Two NGOs who did not appreciate the importance of sustainability planning before RiskNet2 have now developed strong and realistic plans.

- The most significant progress was made by NGOs already invested in the importance of sustainability planning before RiskNet2. These NGOs were able to move beyond initial planning to specific project design including developing a fee-for-service scheme for some clients and identifying a small business opportunity to generate ongoing funding for the project.

LESSONS LEARNED

A network structure is effective in supporting NGO activities

Overall, RiskNet2 demonstrated that it is effective to create and sustain a network of NGOs to improve technical capacity and organizational sustainability. If the project were to be replicated in other regions of the world, project managers would need to give careful consideration to project objectives and membership as these factors will impact the design and management of the network.

NGO sustainability requires a long-term and comprehensive effort

Building technical expertise and organizational sustainability is more than just offering workshops; it requires considerable ongoing in-country support from local and international experts. Ultimately, it will require change throughout an entire organization. Continuity of funding is critical to design and implement effective programs.

Buy-in and participation of management is critical

Management must be fully engaged to achieve organizational impact. Practically, for the NGO, this means that all relevant staff should participate in technical or organizational capacity building activities. Also, trainings and resources need to be in a language that is accessible to the participants, relying solely on English speaking staff to transfer information and skills to the rest of the organization impedes progress.

CONCLUSION

RiskNet proved that, with little time and money, it is possible to develop a network that can improve members' technical capacity and organizational sustainability. The building of technical capacity requires financial resources and technical assistance, and requires network members to be held accountable for their performance. NGO network development is labor-intensive and demands third-party project management.

Organizational sustainability is an issue that must be addressed from project inception. The tendency is for projects to produce a laundry list of areas to be covered in training sessions--the "wide but shallow" syndrome. What is needed is a "deep but narrow" approach that requires a change of culture, emphasizing long-term planning, continuous improvement in management skills, and the fully engaged support of top management. It is not easy to measure progress of NGO sustainability, but its importance is crucial.

INTRODUCTION

Operating from October 1, 2005, through December 31, 2006, RiskNet2 was the second and final phase of the RiskNet project. It adopted a regional approach to reducing the transmission of STIs, HIV, and other blood-borne viruses by supporting NGO outreach activities targeted to MARPs, including ethnic minorities, injecting drug users (IDUs), commercial sex workers (CSWs), and men who have sex with men (MSM). This support for outreach activities was multifaceted, including (1) technical training on international best practice models for outreach and (2) assessment and strengthening of organizational management capacity. Specifically, the project provided technical assistance and $105,000 in grants to six local NGOs with experience working with MARPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Croatia.

Only those NGOs active at the end of the first phase of RiskNet (January 2002–September 2005) were eligible to apply for RiskNet2 because the 10-month grant period was too short to expect new NGOs to be able to achieve project goals. In addition, whereas the first phase of RiskNet included activities supported by the USAID mission in Macedonia, changing mission priorities meant that this funding was not available in the second phase.

Each of the six NGOs that applied for the second phase were accepted for continued participation based on past grant performance and identified organizational development needs.

The box below lists each of the participating RiskNet2 NGOs.

NGOS PARTICIPATING IN RISKNET2

Country	City	NGO	Target Group*			
			IDU	Roma	CSW	MSM
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Sarajevo	XY Association		√√		√√
Bulgaria	Sofia	Initiative for Health	√√	√	√√	√
	Plovdiv	Panacea	√√	√	√√	√
	Borgas	Dose of Love	√√	√	√√	√
Croatia	Rejika	Terra	√√	√	√	√
	Zagreb	LET	√√		√√	

* A √√ signifies that the target group is a main target of the NGO. A √ signifies that the group is either a secondary target or a group served by the NGO as a subset of one of the main target groups (e.g., a Roma IDU).

1. HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIOLOGY IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Southeast Europe is believed to be a low-level epidemic. In other words, prevalence among the general population is less than 1 percent and among key MARP populations is less than 5 percent. Second-generation surveillance* conducted with the support of Bulgaria's, Macedonia's, and Croatia's Global Fund grants have confirmed these figures. (Bosnia and Herzegovina won a Global Fund grant only in fourth-quarter 2006 and thus has not yet instituted national surveillance.)

It is worth noting, however, that the sample sizes and methodology for the surveillance studies have led some to question the validity of the results. In general, the studies relied heavily on the convenience sampling of clients served by HIV prevention NGOs. In Macedonia, where the surveillance study found no HIV cases at all, only 14 MSM were tested. In Croatia, where prevalence among CSWs was estimated at about 1 percent, about 50 CSWs were tested.

Fortunately, however, the region is moving to more sophisticated sampling for future efforts. Croatia is currently using respondent-driven sampling (RDS) for its 2006 national surveillance. The World Health Organization considers RDS to be the current best practice for sampling hard-to-reach populations and for producing the most accurate sample possible of such groups.

In any case, dangerous misconceptions about HIV transmission abound. In Macedonia, for example, only 10 percent of interviewed CSWs and 34 percent of interviewed MSM correctly identified ways to prevent HIV infection and rejected the major misconceptions about transmission (i.e., met the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) indicators of adequate HIV prevention knowledge). In Bulgaria, the results were 7 percent for Roma and 12 percent for CSWs.

Along with a knowledge gap, risky behaviors are pervasive. Surveillance studies in Bulgaria revealed a 64 percent hepatitis C prevalence rate among IDUs and a 22 percent syphilis rate among CSWs, both disease markers indicating high-risk behavior. In Croatia, only 32 percent of IDUs reported the adoption of risk-reduction behavior for sexual and drug-injecting practices.

Little is known about the size and behavior of the "bridge populations" in Southeast Europe that might facilitate transmission of the virus from sexual partners of IDUs, CSWs or MSM to the general population. However, in a setting such as Southeast Europe where the epidemic is young and HIV is clustered in core groups, bridging poses a significant risk. For example, in the case of IDUs, either socially integrated IDUs or those with substantial links to non-injectors can transmit the virus sexually to sexual networks with no direct connection to the IDU population. In Bulgaria, only 46 percent of IDUs reported the use of a condom at last sex with a non-regular partner. For MSM, risk is associated with concurrent female sexual partners. Twenty-eight percent of MSM respondents in a Population Services International (PSI) Internet-delivered survey reported having had sex with a woman in the past year. Nearly 50 percent of these women were wives or stable girlfriends.

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*2005 UNGASS Indicators Country Reports

Given that these high-risk groups are highly marginalized and sometimes engage in illegal behavior, prevention efforts with such groups are best handled by NGOs. For this reason, RiskNet2 was designed to deliver technical, financial and management resources to NGOs so that they could reach marginalized groups and work effectively with them.

2. RISKNET2 DELIVERABLES

The three main deliverables for RiskNet2 were:

- To support the provision of outreach services to MARPs;

- To contribute to NGO sustainability; and

- To evaluate the implementation of MARP outreach models and efforts to increase organizational sustainability.

2.1 MARP OUTREACH

During the 2006 RiskNet2 grant period, five of the six NGOs (all but XY in Bosnia and Herzegovina) used the Gatekeeper Reach model. XY, and one of the NGOs using Gatekeeper Reach (Panacea), adopted a new intervention approach called the Gatekeeper Effectiveness model, though only XY succeeded in achieving RiskNet2 goals.

A. Gatekeeper Reach
A gatekeeper is a member of the target population who has access to and influence over a portion of the target population. In the case of NGOs dealing with HIV prevention, gatekeepers act as surrogate NGO staff, distributing prevention materials, health products, and testing vouchers to individuals that an NGO is unable to reach.

The reach of NGO services was extended with the provision of financial and technical resources to the NGO coupled with heightened NGO capability to monitor their own performance. For example, during the grant period, the total number of clients served by NGOs using the Gatekeeper Reach model increased by 23 percent and the number of monthly contacts made with clients grew by 48 percent. Between January 1 and September 30, 2006, the number of new clients registered with the network expanded by 10 percent over the previous year.

Annex A provides more details on growth in the coverage of NGO services. Section 2.3.A. discusses the results of each NGO's performance.

B. Gatekeeper Effectiveness
In addition to increasing the reach of an NGO, gatekeepers can change behavior among friends if they are trained in persuasively endorsing risk reduction. Similar programs in the United States and

Eastern Europe, sometimes called Popular Opinion Leader (POL) programs, have recorded increases in condom use from 16 to 49 percent and decreases in the percent of people engaging in unprotected sex from 25 to 33 percent.[*,†,‡]

In 2005, RiskNet hired trainers from the Bulgarian organization Health and Social Development (HESED) to train the network in the gatekeeper methodology. HESED has implemented the gatekeeper model in Sofia, Bulgaria, with MSM gatekeepers and has worked extensively with the University of Wisconsin's Center for AIDS Intervention Research, which developed the POL model. At a two-day workshop, HESED introduced the concept to the entire network and then worked closely for an additional two days with XY, the NGO that the project team judged most capable of implementing such a program.

Briefly, the program trains gatekeepers over the course of four sessions in the basics of HIV/STI/hepatitis prevention, in how to identify barriers to healthy behavior among friends, and in how to communicate risk reduction strategies persuasively. Much of the time is devoted to practicing communication skills, both during the trainings as role-plays and between sessions as "homework." Most important, however, trainers try to build intrinsic motivation within the participants to encourage them to engage in risk reduction conversations with their friends after completion of the training sessions. To that end, trainers place significant emphasis on gatekeepers as informal community leaders to help prevent an HIV epidemic among friends.

In keeping with established best practices, a modest financial incentive was included to acknowledge the considerable time spent by participants at these trainings (usually more than 10 hours).

Section 2.3.B. outlines the results of XY's experience with the model.

2.2 NGO SUSTAINABILITY

The team of PSI, Abt Associates Inc. and O'Hanlon Health Consulting conducted two NGO assessments at the start of RiskNet2.

The first assessment, which addressed all general areas of organizational development, was part of the application process required for each NGO's continued participation in RiskNet2. One result of the assessment was the decision to focus on sustainability planning issues, specifically strategic planning for each NGO's future direction and revenue diversification. With only 10 months available to work with the NGOs, strategic planning became the priority focus of the technical assistance.

Annex B provides a summary of each NGO's organizational strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats as identified in the assessment.

The second assessment – implemented through a short survey distributed to each NGO's staff and through individual interviews with the RiskNet coordinators – focused on organizational management in

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[*] Amirkhanian, Y.A., Kelly, Kabakchieva, Kirsanova, Vassileva, Takacs, DiFranceiso, McAuliffe, Khoursine, Mocsonaki. "A randomized social network HIV prevention trial with young men who have sex with men in Russia and Bulgaria." *AIDS Education and Prevention,* Vol. 19, No. 16 (2005): 1897-1905.

[†] Kelly J.A., Murpy, Sikkema, McAuliffe, Roffman, Solomon, Winett, Kalichman, and the Community HIV Prevention Research Collaborative. "Randomized, controlled, community-level HIV-prevention intervention for sexual-risk behavior among homosexual men in US cities." *The Lancet*, Vol. 350 (1997): 1500-1505.

[‡] Kelly J.A., Lawrence, Diaz, Stevenson, Hauth, Brasfield, Kalichman, Smith, Andrew. "HIV risk behavior reduction following intervention with key opinion leaders of population: an experimental analysis." *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 81, No. 2 (1991): 168-171.

order to inform the technical assistance effort. The outcome of this assessment was the decision to focus on strengthening the skills, tools and systems for managing staff performance through the provision of formal and informal feedback. Building organizational capacity to manage employee performance was one of two areas that appeared as a priority for five of the six NGOs and was identified as a feasible focus by the project team given the time and resource constraints of the grant.

Annex C summarizes the assessment's major findings.

RiskNet provided 213 person-days of training and in-country consultation, of which 155 days (73 percent) focused on the sustainability issues revealed in the assessments, including financial sustainability and the NGOs' ability to properly prepare for, manage and monitor activities and projects. These totals do not include work conducted by the project team outside the target countries, site visits, or the many emails and telephone calls.

Annex D describes the technical assistance effort.

As part of the trainings and consultancies, RiskNet achieved the following:

- Four NGOs developed strategic plans (XY and DoL developed theirs independently of RiskNet2).

- Five NGOs (all but Terra) completed new financial analyses to cost out their strategic plans.

- All six NGOs developed future funding strategies to diversify their revenue streams.

- Five NGOs (all but Panacea) wrote job descriptions for each of their positions.

- Four NGOs designed, with the project team's help, a formal performance evaluation system (DoL and IfHF had initiated work on a system independently).

Section 2.3.C. discusses the results of these activities.

2.3   EVALUATION

Annex E provides the USAID-approved project evaluation matrix.

A. Gatekeeper Reach
As compared with their contracted goals, the NGOs' actual 2006 performance was strong, although underperformance by Panacea and Initiative for Health somewhat depressed the total.

COMBINED PERFORMANCE OF RISKNET2 NGOS, JANUARY TO OCTOBER 2006

Measure	January to October 2006 All NGOs Combined		
	Actual	Goal	Percent Achieved
Monthly average of clients served	1,887	1,892	100%
Total new clients	1,440	1,145	126%
Monthly average of client contacts	5,223	4,127	127%
Monthly average of active gatekeepers	38	37	100%
Total clients tested	1,384	1,148	121%

The following charts summarize each NGO's performance as compared with its contracted goal. Overall, each NGO met or exceeded expectations, with the exception of Panacea and Initiative for Health.

INDIVIDUAL NGO PERFORMANCE VS. CONTRACTED GOALS

Dose of Love (DoL)–Borgas, Bulgaria

Measure	Actual	Goal	Percent Achieved	Comments
Unique clients	367	285	129%	At the mid-term report, DoL was significantly behind in its testing goal because of difficulties with the local government testing clinic. With the difficulties resolved in May, DoL exceeded its goal.
New clients	549	300	183%	
Client contacts	1,526	769	198%	
Gatekeepers	14	10	140%	
Clients tested	922	614	150%	The dramatic overdeliveries are primarily a result of increased work with CSWs. After three years, DoL has now won the confidence of more pimps and is allowed more access to their workers.

LET–Zagreb, Croatia

Measure	Actual	Goal	Percent Achieved	Comments
Unique clients	383	341	112%	Of all the network NGOs, LET most consistently delivers what it promises. The NGO is aware of its capacities and knows how to set realistic but challenging goals and meet them.
New clients	169	150	113%	
Client contacts	1,484	1,044	142%	
Gatekeepers	7	7	100%	
Clients tested	102	100	102%	

Terra–Rejika, Croatia

Measure	Actual	Goal	Percent Achieved	Comments
Unique clients	433	377	115%	Terra had to renegotiate its testing goal after first-quarter 2006 because of difficulties with the local public health institute. The institute forbade Terra to test on its premises; as a result, the NGO does so only when a client refuses to go to the government clinic and would otherwise not be tested.
New clients	157	145	108%	
Client contacts	654	592	110%	
Gatekeepers	6	5	120%	
Clients tested	47	65	72%	

Initiative for Health Foundation (IfHF)–Sofia, Bulgaria

Measure	Actual	Goal	Percent Achieved	Comments
Unique clients	483	611	79%	IfHF renegotiated its goals after first-quarter 2006 because of a substantial loss in active gatekeepers, due in part to the hiatus during the application process for RiskNet2 in fourth-quarter 2005.
New clients	141	220	64%	
Client contacts	859	1,013	85%	
Gatekeepers	7	10	70%	
Clients tested	313	369	85%	IfHF is behind on its testing goal; lack of equipment from the Center for Addiction during the first two months prevented any testing. Even with the renegotiated goal, the NGO is underperforming. In addition to lack of gatekeepers, IfHF attributes its underperformance to increased police activity, which made it difficult to access clients during outreach.

Panacea–Plovdiv, Bulgaria				
Measure*	Actual	Goal	Percent Achieved	Comments
Unique clients	221	278	79%	The project team sees two reasons for Panacea's underdelivery, as discussed further in Section 2.3.C.
New clients	424	330	128%	
Client contacts	700	709	99%	First, its human resources were insufficient to handle the the work related to the referral into care and support services of several HIV-positive cases identified through outreach.
Gatekeepers	4	5	80%	

The project team sees two reasons for Panacea's underdelivery, as discussed further in Section 2.3.C.

First, its human resources were insufficient to handle the the work related to the referral into care and support services of several HIV-positive cases identified through outreach.

Second, Panacea tried to implement two programs for RiskNet at the same time–both the Gatekeeper Reach and Gatekeeper Effectiveness models. It is the project team's opinion that work on two programs further taxed the NGO's human resources, making it even more difficult to execute outreach activities.

Fortunately, Panacea is petitioning Global Fund Bulgaria for funds for additional human resources. However, the project team believes that the solution does not lie in human resources alone. The NGO must become better at strategically prioritizing its work.

B. Gatekeeper Effectiveness
1. *XY Results*
Originally, RiskNet2 intended to measure the impact of XY's intervention with knowledge attitude practices (KAP) studies that would capture self-reported condom use and HIV testing of individuals reached through outreach activities. However, the project was later modified with USAID's consent in response to concerns about the available budget and XY's capacity to implement KAP studies. Instead, XY was evaluated with pre-/post-test results of its trainees and through collection other qualitative evidence of behavior change among the gatekeepers and the wider target group.

XY implemented a pre-training survey with both Roma and MSM gatekeepers, though the NGO was able to implement only a post-training survey with MSM as a consequence of turnover in XY's Roma gatekeepers. In addition, XY used two surrogate measures of behavior change: HIV testing and the number of condoms taken by MSM visiting the XY gay men's drop-in center.

XY trained 75 male Roma and 50 MSM informal community leaders. Each Roma and MSM gatekeeper went on to engage in risk reduction conversations with at least six and five friends, respectively.

A comparison between the pre- and post-surveys of MSM gatekeepers showed important changes in knowledge. For example, the number of respondents who did not know how to use

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* There is no Clients Tested measure as Panacea's budget and scope of work did not include this activity.

a condom properly decreased by 59 percent (from 85 percent at baseline to 35 percent at follow-up). Likewise, the number of respondents who thought that it is possible to identify an HIV-positive person by sight dropped from 12 to 0 percent.

Regarding behavior, through its voucher referral system, XY is aware of at least 36 MSM who were tested for HIV during the time of the Gatekeeper intervention as compared with only 15 during the same period a year earlier, or a 140 percent increase.

During the intervention months, condom uptake by MSM visiting the drop-in center increased considerably versus earlier months. During the first month of the program, it increased 20 percent over previous months and, by the sixth month of the program, it had climbed to more than 172 percent over pre-intervention levels.

Overall, XY believes that the MSM program was much more successful than the Roma program for several reasons. In particular, the NGO does not believe that it was effective in identifying Roma with intrinsic motivation to advocate for risk reduction with their friends. In any future endeavors, XY would target a different Roma group – informal traditional "healers" who presumably are already involved in caring for their community's health.

2. *Panacea Results*
Panacea also applied to RiskNet to implement the Gatekeeper Effectiveness model, though the project team did not support Panacea's proposal, arguing that Gatekeeper Reach obligations were already taxing the NGO's capacity. In the end, the project team relented and allowed the NGO to attempt implementation of the model in the hope that the effort would stress with management the importance of strategically focusing limited resources.

As feared, Panacea did not succeed in implementing any of the Gatekeeper Effectiveness training sessions. Unfortunately, post-project debriefings indicated that is not clear if management understands that it overreached by trying to implement both programs.

Section 2.3.C. discusses the issue further.

C. Organizational Development
As a result of RiskNet2's sustainability component, the participating NGOs are now better positioned to survive in the medium term. As described below, NGOs entered the project at varying levels of readiness and as a result are leaving it with different degrees of benefits.

1. *Sustainability Planning*
a) The baseline assessment of organizational development revealed the following weaknesses:
i) Each NGO thought of itself as a collection of individual programs and not as an organization with an independent or clear purpose.
ii) Mission and vision statements were weak, and goals and strategies were often unrelated to each other or not strategic.
iii) Funding at all but one NGO (IfHF) was overly reliant on a single foreign donor.
iv) Only two NGOs (XY and DoL) listed financial sustainability as a strategic goal.
v) No NGO had any type of cost-recovery scheme.

b) As a direct result of the organizational capacity building delivered by RiskNet2, the following changes occurred:
i) All NGO mission and vision statements provided a clear definition of the organization for outside stakeholders.

ii) NGO goals are organizationally rather than programmatically based.

iii) The project team considers the goals of all but one NGO (Panacea) to be well defined and realistic.

iv) Five NGOs (all but XY) used specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time bound (SMART) objectives.

v) Five NGOs (all but XY) have developed operational plans for at least one year.

vi) The level of staff internalization and understanding of the strategic plans differed by NGO:
- At XY, DoL IfHF, and Terra, the majority of staff interviewed by PSI could spontaneously recite parts of the strategic plan;
- At LET, staff was organized according to function; while managers understood the organizational scheme well, outreach workers did not;
- At Panacea, staff struggled to describe the plan in their own words.

vii) All NGOs set forth financial sustainability as a specific strategic goal.

viii) All NGOs set forth organizational development as a specific strategic goal.

ix) All but one NGO (Terra) costed out their new strategic plans.

x) All NGOs set forth revenue diversification strategies for the near future:
- The project team considers Panacea's and XY's strategies as overly ambitious or unrealistic.

xi) Two NGOs are actively pursuing significant income-generation activities (IGA) to help promote financial sustainability:
- Terra will begin a fee-for-service scheme for some of its counseling clients; RiskNet2 provided a consultant to develop an administrative, legal, and financial plan;
- DoL will open a small business whose profits will be used to further the objectives of the project after funding ends; RiskNet2 provided $4,500 for the purchase of start-up equipment and supplies.

xii) Two NGO are pursuing more modest income generation activities that do not require new skills or activities:
- IfHF will pursue more opportunities to implement research studies with clients, building on earlier efforts with U.S.-based universities;
- LET will build on existing skills and expertise, such as organizing conferences and consulting with less developed NGOs.

xiii) NGOs have taken different approaches to pursuing new donors:
- Terra, LET, XY, and IfHF were already fairly well diversified with respect to the number and type of donors, and they continued to devote significant effort to pursuing both old and new opportunities;
- DoL relied on only three donors in 2005 but, as reported above, has been aggressively pursuing revenue diversification schemes and approached two new donors in 2006; and
- Panacea approached only one new donor in 2006 (a joint application to the European Commission (EC) with IfHF and DoL). However, it has found additional funding to continue its relationship with the local strategic planning consultant and will receive training in project design and proposal writing.

xiv) The nature and depth of NGO ties to local communities/government differs by NGO; in fact, the project team believes that such differences are a function of factors that go beyond RiskNet2. For example, almost all the NGOs work closely with their respective Ministry of Health as a result of how Global Fund grants are managed. In addition, some evidence during 2006 suggested that NGO relations with local community and political relations have strengthened:

- o The city government granted IfHF the use of heavily discounted space for a drop-in center in a Roma quarter of Sofia;
- o DoL successfully lobbied the Ministry of Health to resolve a dispute with the city's STI/HIV testing clinic in order to accommodate MARP clients;
- o Terra won financial support from the county government for the first time;
- o LET won support from the State Office for NGOs to plan the 2007 National Addictions Conference.

2. *Managing Performance*

   a) The baseline assessment revealed the following weaknesses:
      i) Most NGO staff members (except for LET staff) were dissatisfied with their organization's reward and recognition mechanisms;
      ii) None of the NGOs had a culture or formal system for providing feedback in managing performance.
      iii) None of the NGOs had a salary or bonus system linked to an evaluation system.
      iv) In addition, because the project team had worked with these NGOs over a period of several years, they had observed that, in general, personnel management skills needed strengthening. Most of the NGOs were staffed with social workers or activists, not staff with extensive management experience.

   b) As a result of the organizational management capacity building of RiskNet2, the following changes occurred:
      i) Five NGOs (all but Panacea) had written job descriptions for each position.
      ii) Five NGOs (all but Panacea) had instituted a formal evaluation system.
      iii) Two NGOs (DoL and IfHF) had already implemented their performance evaluation system.
      iv) All NGOs reported that the quality of their oral feedback is now more effective.
      v) Most NGOs (all but DoL), however, reported that oral feedback is underused as a tool for proactively managing employee performance (versus using such feedback only to resolve problems).

3. NGO Specifics

   A summary of the following information can be found in Attachment G.

   a) *Dose of Love (Borgas, Bulgaria)*
   Geographically located where it has historically been difficult to access foreign donors, DoL has long understood the importance of sustainability planning and, among the six NGOs, made the greatest progress in planning for the long term both before and during RiskNet2. As a result, DoL benefited more than any other NGO from RiskNet2.

   Before RiskNet2 introduced the topic of sustainability planning, DoL had applied for and won a grant for a free consultancy for the development of a strategic plan. It had also begun implementing a revenue diversification plan that included the solicitation of equipment donations from local businesses, and it secured the services of a university business student to conduct market research and write a business plan for an IGA.

   To reward DoL's initiative and assist its efforts, RiskNet2 awarded DoL $4,500 in additional grant money for the purchase of start-up equipment and supplies for its IGA, which is a launderette targeted to university students who otherwise must carry their clothes home when they visit their families. With the profits from the launderette, DoL will supplement future gatekeeper activities and, when possible, provide employment for clients.

Despite its successes, DoL faces challenges, particularly the challenge of securing sufficient funding. Fortunately, management has been doing everything possible to address the funding issue. In 2006, DoL applied to two new donors, the EC and Charity AIDS Foundation, and became an "associative partner" on an EC project in the Baltic. DoL's executive director has also taken classes at the local university to understand how to run a small business.

b) *Panacea (Plovdiv, Bulgaria)*
Panacea is the most troubled NGO in the network. The project team is not sure of the form that Panacea will take after Global Fund support expires at the end of 2008.

Panacea's human resources are stretched dangerously thin as illustrated by the fact that the NGO could not execute its prevention activities when several clients tested HIV-positive and Panacea had to help arrange for their care and support. To compound matters, Panacea faces difficulties in strategically prioritizing its work and often undertakes too broad a span of activities rather than focusing on a discrete set of activities. As an example, Panacea has elected to implement both the Gatekeeper Reach and Gatekeeper Effectiveness models against the advice of the project team.

Fortunately, the strategic planning process may have mitigated Panacea's tendency to take on more than it can handle. Its operational plan is much less ambitious in the near term than its longer-term strategic plan. However, post-project debriefing with management revealed that managers do not fully agree that they overreached when they tried to implement both gatekeeper models simultaneously.

The other major sign of Panacea's poor sustainability position is that the NGO has never initiated an application for donor funding on its own even though it has been talking about doing so for years. Its only new donor application in 2006 was a joint application with IfHF and DoL.

However, the most promising sign for Panacea is that it has retained the services of its consultant to teach the NGO about project design and proposal writing. This significant development demonstrates that at least part of the organization's management team understands the challenges faced by the organization.

c) *Initiative for Health Foundation (Sofia, Bulgaria)*
IfHF was initially reluctant to add a capacity-building component to the project, much less develop a strategic plan or engage in revenue diversification. However, in the end, IfHF enthusiastically embraced the importance of both activities. Its change in direction is evidenced by the fact that IfHF is the only NGO that, on its own initiative, surveyed its clients and stakeholders before writing a strategic plan, which led to an expanded scope of work that included more advocacy activities with the government. Furthermore, with other funding, IfHF has retained the services of its consultant to help implement its operational plan and address specific issues during plan implementation.

With respect to revenue diversification, IfHF aggressively manages its funding pipeline and is continuously seeking out new donors and applying for grants. For example, in 2006, it approached, applied to, or won support from seven donors. While it is difficult to determine the degree to which RiskNet2 activities played a role in achieving such revenue diversity, the project team believes that the project played a part in helping the NGO expand its thinking and thus the diversity of its revenue stream.

In summary, IfHF is the best-positioned Bulgarian RiskNet2 NGO because of strong donor support and, now, because of a sound sustainability plan. The project team believes that had RiskNet2 not assisted with sustainability planning, IfHF would not have moved so far or so quickly on the matter.

d) *XY Association (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina)*
XY started the sustainability planning process far ahead of the other five NGOs because of its relationship with the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). However, the project team believes that the same relationship has held the NGO back from progressing as far as it might. For example, IPPF pays XY's core operating costs and helped the NGO develop a strategic plan for the period 2005–2009. Unfortunately, however, the strategic plan does not use SMART objectives and has not led to any type of organizationally based operational plan.

During the course of RiskNet2, XY learned how its plan could be improved, but it would not amend the plan because IPPF had provided technical assistance for plan development and had signed off on the plan. To the project team, XY's attitude to the plan indicates that XY has not fully internalized the importance of such a plan and to some extent still views the plan as a donor deliverable. Similarly, given that XY receives core funding from IPPF, the project team has detected no sense of urgency in XY's diversification of its revenue stream. Bosnia and Herzegovina has just been awarded a Global Fund grant for HIV/AIDS, and XY expects that the grant and the IPPF support will provide sufficient coverage for the near term.

XY does, however, understand the need for some type of partial cost-recovery scheme for its clients, but it has yet to make any progress toward implementation. The project team notes that experience in other countries shows that implementation of a cost-recovery plan requires considerable time.

XY will continue to be a leading HIV prevention NGO in Bosnia and Herzegovina because of its internal technical capacity and favorable external conditions. While XY's relationship with IPPF has been advantageous, it might prevent the NGO from moving more rapidly to improve its sustainability. It is too soon to say if XY will begin the transition in time, but at least the NGO had the opportunity through RiskNet2 to consider the issues and can rely on IPPF for further assistance.

e) *LET (Zagreb, Croatia)*
LET was initially doubtful about the strategic planning and revenue diversification parts of RiskNet2's sustainability component. The executive director thought a strategic plan was unnecessary; she stated that she had a clear vision of what needed to be done and how to do it and stressed that enough local and foreign support was available to achieve the NGO's vision. However, by the end, project management did understand the benefits of planning and of engaging the entire NGO in the planning activity.

For example, by undertaking the planning exercise, LET decided to drop the educational component of its mission and instead focus only on HIV/AIDS prevention and the provision of assistance to single mothers. The planning process also revealed opportunities for LET to generate income by leveraging activities in which it had already developed expertise, such as conference planning and consulting with less developed NGOs on proposal writing. Furthermore, NGO staff credit the strategic planning process with helping bring together the NGO's two sets of project activities and creating an organization-focused outlook rather than solely a project-based perspective.

It is important to note that the executive director was initially reluctant to allow an outside strategic planning consultant to review all of the NGO's internal documents. However, recruitment of a consultant acceptable to both the NGO and the project team overcame the executive director's reticence and stressed the importance of executive director buy-in to the planning process. Nevertheless, buy-in should not be linked to other factors, such as grant receipt.

The project team predicts that LET will continue to play a major role in HIV/AIDS prevention in Croatia for some time. Its future organizational challenges are minimal as compared with those of some other network NGOs. LET's external conditions are favorable in that the Croatian government supports NGOs involved in HIV/AIDS work; the executive director is adept at building political ties and securing financial support; and LET is now working from a realistic and sound sustainability plan.

f) *Terra (Rejika, Croatia)*
Even before its participation in RiskNet2, Terra understood the importance of sustainability planning. It had developed a strategic plan four years earlier and had decided that it should one day implement a fee-for-service scheme. As a result, Terra has benefited more than most NGOs from RiskNet2.

Clearly, Terra was well prepared to lead the sustainability planning process, using the consultant as a resource rather than as a guide. As a result of its embrace of strategic planning, Terra is one of the few NGOs that intends to use the quantitative goals in its operational plan as benchmarks against which to measure progress.

The strategic planning process helped Terra make some difficult decisions. For example, it decided to decline an offer from the city of Rejika to open and operate an IDU therapeutic commune. It is not usual or easy for NGOs to walk away from guaranteed funding.

With RiskNet2's help, Terra will finally take action on an idea it has been developing for some time–initiation of a partial cost-recovery scheme by charging some of its clients for counseling services currently provided for free. RiskNet2 hired a consultant who participated in jointly developing a legal, administrative, and financial plan for implementation of the scheme, which will begin in 2007.

Terra's biggest organizational challenge will be management of employee burnout as it adds to its administrative obligations with state registration of the profits generated from its counseling services. Management has begun to address the issue by recruiting more unpaid volunteers to lighten the staff's workload. Beyond this, Terra seems well positioned for the future.

3. DISCUSSION

3.1 LESSONS LEARNED: ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The project team believes any programmatic strategy should dedicate resources to organizational sustainability, taking into account the following lessons learned and associated recommendations:

A. Include sustainability efforts from the outset
   Improving sustainability ultimately requires change throughout an organization's entire culture. Such an effort takes more than the 10 months afforded to RiskNet2

B. Understand that one-off workshops have limited utility
   Executing a laundry list of training sessions on various topics does not necessarily build new skills or change the organizational culture. Additional "channels" for building capacity are required, such as hiring long-term in-country consultants and conducting in-country workshops with the entire staff.

   Furthermore, reliance on one-off workshops leads the project in the direction of "wide and shallow" rather than "deep and narrow." RiskNet2's experience with building management skills stresses that focusing on one aspect of a skill area (e.g., providing staff performance feedback) to the exclusion of others is likely to have limited impact by failing to address other barriers holistically.

C. Allow an NGO to choose from different programs or tracks
   Offer options such as sustainability planning, management and leadership, technical capacity, and so forth rather than requiring participation in all programs. Most NGOs are stretched thin and struggle just to meet their normal deliverables. Permitting an NGO to select tracks of greatest interest can help ensure that that the NGO will devote the needed time to the program and motivate a high level of participation. It also allows each track to go deeper and cover more topic areas.

D. Uncouple grants from all tracks except the technical capacity track
   The project team believes that the management of some NGOs considered the capacity-building activities as a "price" to be paid for continuing their grants. Management's motivation for change is an absolute precondition for success and should not be influenced by financial considerations.

E. Focus solely on sustainability planning if time or resources are limited
   Most NGOs believe that uncertain financial or political conditions in their country prohibit planning. Of course, exactly the opposite is true. Under such conditions, planning is essential; if management can be convinced of planning's pivotal role, then management's participation in planning can itself be considered a project win. Furthermore, as was the case with IfHF, the process of strategic planning can change participants' opinion about the subject.

F. Budget for in-country consultancies, especially for sustainability planning
   Most NGOs need considerable support during sustainability planning; the planning process takes a significant amount of time and requires the participation of the entire organization. Periodic workshops or long-distance technical assistance is insufficient.

G. Consider the idea of mandating personal readings to coincide with technical assistance
    Besides increasing exposure to the extensive body of knowledge on topics such as management /
    leadership and organizational development, mandatory readings will help create a culture of learning
    and self-improvement within the NGO. Participants could then regularly gather to discuss their
    readings, further reinforcing organizational change.

H. Ensure that the appropriate people participate
    If an NGO is to participate in the management and leadership track, all senior managers should
    attend the workshops, meetings, and so forth.

I. Provide technical assistance in the language of the management team
    Relying on the resident English speaker to attend all trainings, regardless of the track, impedes the
    transfer of information.

J. Appreciate that support from the executive director is critical
    Everything starts at the top, and if top management is not fully engaged, it is nearly impossible to
    achieve impact.

3.2   LESSONS LEARNED: MANAGING A NETWORK

There is no reason to think that NGO technical and organizational support networks like RiskNet2
cannot be replicated in other settings. The following list of lessons learned and associated
recommendations provide some guidance about managing future networks. Many, but not all, of these
items also appear in the 2005 RiskNet Final Report.

A. Recognize that constant follow-up and support is required to help NGOs fulfill the administrative
    obligations of programmatic funding
    These administrative tasks extend to accurate reporting, meeting deadlines, setting realistic but
    aggressive goals, and maintaining timely communication with the lead organization. Some NGOs
    were more successful than others in completing administrative requirements and fortunately, all
    improved over time. However, the amount of follow-up and support required from the network
    manager should not be underestimated, especially if a project involves several countries.

B. Facilitate learning from sources external and internal to the network
    Some NGOs will be more advanced than others. A network provides the structure and connections
    that encourage the more advanced NGOs to mentor NGOs that are young or new to the network,
    thereby building the capacity of both the mentor and mentored. IfHF played this role when DoL and
    Panacea joined the network in 2004.

C. Use a mix of international and local experts
    Local experts bring insight into the situation on the ground. International experts introduce foreign
    best practices and new ideas.

D. Recognize that, as the network grows larger, the delivery of technical assistance will become
    increasingly difficult
    More NGOs with varying capacity and different purposes will require different types and levels of
    technical assistance.

E. Allow NGOs to make their own mistakes
Panacea insisted on implementing both gatekeeper models. The project team could have rejected Panacea's request, but then the NGO would not have had the opportunity to change its position on the issue.

F. Implement in a region that shares a common language
Working only with the NGO's resident English speaker slows the diffusion of information within the NGO and sometimes means that the appropriate person does not attend trainings or meetings.

G. Commit resources upfront for a multiyear program
It is important to recognize a program's duration and commit resources accordingly.

H. If at all possible, assure continuity of funding
It is critical that programmatic funding is consistent over the period of the grant, allowing NGOs to plan and implement programs with consistent integrity. The specific example in this project was the difficulty that IfHF had in retaining gatekeepers during gaps in funding.

I. Include features that the NGOs themselves value.
- *Assistance implementing international best practices that are applicable to the mission of the NGO.* –Because the gatekeeper models were applicable to the work of the participating NGOS, each NGO plans to continue working with the model.
- *Constant contact with and technical assistance visits from the project team*--NGOs report that RiskNet2 was one of the few projects in which the donor knew what the NGO was doing.
- *Country-specific workshops for gatekeepers*–Gatekeepers remained highly motivated when they were invited to another city to participate in special trainings, as typically occurred in Bulgaria.

3.3 BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO NETWORK SUSTAINABILITY

The question of sustaining a project such as RiskNet2 should be considered in light of project objectives. In Central and Eastern Europe, many existing networks focus on different activities and demonstrate varying levels of involvement. The project team believes that networks organized around a specific purpose are more successful than those that merely facilitate networking and information exchange.

RiskNet2's original purpose was clear, and the project has achieved several successes; member NGOs now reach more clients than before project implementation and take advantage of better intervention tools and information about their target groups. The network's "reason for being" would have ceased to exist had an additional purpose not been added to the project–to help improve NGO sustainability.

The project team believes that, if RiskNet2 were to be replicated elsewhere, it should have a clear and distinct purpose. Once that purpose is met, there is no need for sustaining the project further.

3.4 POSSIBLE FUTURE PURPOSES OF "RISKNET X"

The project team suggests two approaches for defining the purpose of any future versions of RiskNet in Southeastern Europe or elsewhere.

A. Technology Transfer
   Technology transfer is appropriate for an international network of NGOs. Networks provide the technical and financial resources needed by NGOs to adopt a new intervention, although the technology selected for transfer should be appropriate to the local situation. Many interventions have proven to affect behavior positively with different populations, some of which are highlighted on the CDC Web site at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/projects/rep/. In general, NGOs in the field are keen to learn about new models for working with their clients, but their opportunities to do so are limited.

B. Holistic Technical Assistance
   Each NGO's effectiveness is at least partly dependent on other systems. For example, during outreach, an NGO might refer clients for HIV testing, but if post-test counseling is poor, the NGO can inadvertently encourage risky behavior if a client tests negative. A holistic approach would provide technical assistance to all the key systems in a given city or country, promoting the minimum standards and best practices proven elsewhere to affect behavior or HIV incidence.

3.5   CONCLUSION

RiskNet proved that, with little time and money, it is possible to develop a network that can improve members' technical capacity and organizational sustainability. The building of technical capacity requires financial resources and technical assistance, and requires network members to be held accountable for their performance. NGO network development is labor-intensive and demands third-party project management.

Organizational sustainability is an issue that must be addressed from project inception. The tendency is for projects to produce a laundry list of areas to be covered in training sessions--the "wide but shallow" syndrome. What is needed is a "deep but narrow" approach that requires a change of culture emphasizing long-term planning, continuous improvement in management skills, and the fully engaged support of top management. It is not easy to measure progress against NGO sustainability, but its importance is crucial.

ANNEX A: GROWTH IN KEY MEASURES* DURING RISKNET2 GRANT PERIOD

January–October 2006				
Total Network**	**First Quarter 2006**	**Second Quarter 2006**	**Third Quarter 2006^**	**Project End**
UNIQUE CLIENTS	1,540	1,816	1,887	1,887 average per month
Change versus previous month		18%	4%	N/A
Change versus first-quarter 2006				23%
CLIENT CONTACTS	3,527	4,165	5,223	5,223 average per month
Change versus previous month		18%	25%	N/A
Change versus first-quarter 2006				48%

	TOTAL 2006 NETWORK** January through September 2005 versus January through September 2006		
	2005	**2006**	**Percent Increase**
Number of new clients	1,140	1,255	10%

* Clients tested not reported here because the percent increase is misleadingly high.
In October 2006, the Global Fund surveillance testing began in Bulgaria, dramatically spiking the results in this measure.

** NGOs are Terra, LET, and Initiative for Health, Panacea, and Dose of Love.

^ Average of the last three months of the grant–August, September, and October.

ANNEX B: SWOT ANALYSIS OF NGOS

NGO	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Dose of Love (Borgas, Bulgaria)	Good reputation in community. Reaches a lot of people. Dedicated and motivated staff. Mobile, flexible, adaptable, professional.	Not enough volunteers. Not enough staff; staff burnout. Insufficient public relations, "hidden." Not enough planning, no organizational structure. Low salaries.	Strong support from government. Desire to expand activities to other towns and expand type of activities to offer package of services. Desire to learn/exchange from other countries' experiences.	Lack of financial security. Lack of support from local authorities. Police and criminalization, stigma. Bulgarian laws for NGOs. Difficult government structure.
Pancea (Plovdiv, Bulgaria)	Dedicated and motivated staff. Young, mobile, flexible, adaptable. Professional, cohesive team. Good achievement, lessons learned on harm reduction.	Insufficient planning and distribution of tasks. Not enough long-term planning. Lack of funding to develop new projects. Limited project focus.	Potential to expand project by motivating and interesting staff. Potential to increase target population with new services. Potential to train team in new services.	Lack of new projects creates fear of losing qualified staff. Insufficient engagement of local authorities and informing them of achievements. May not be sufficiently prepared to take on new projects.
Initiative for Health Foundation (Sofia, Bulgaria)	Lots of experience, international recognition. Innovative, highly skilled, enthusiastic team.	Lack of long-term perspective. Weak team building. Rules not well developed. Poor communication. Low salaries and staff burnout.	Acknowledged international institution with good reputation. Top organization in Bulgaria in this arena. Many international and national partnerships. Entering European Union.	Not competitive at European level. Not enough national funds, depend on foreign donors. Changing donor priorities. No specified system for international funds.
XY Association (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina)	Peer education system. Involved in all aspects of sexual and reproductive health (SRH). Educated, professional, ambitious team. Positive image. Network of volunteers. Strategic plan.	Lack of sustainability and funding. Lack of board participation. Lack of human resources and public relations. Lack of nationwide recognition. Lack of partnership.	Excellent cooperation and exchange with other NGOs and sponsors. Lobbying with parliament to improve legislation regarding SRH. Cooperation with government sector. Institutionalization of peer education system (schools).	No further funding. No protection by law. Counterproductive campaigns. Conservative media. Low quality of free condoms. Unstable political environment.
LET (Zagreb, Croatia)	Professional leadership, well-trained, motivated team. Adaptive, flexible, and open. Efficient staff/program ratio. Solid	Dependent on donors for funds. Not enough staff. Not enough materials (IEC), needles, condoms). Outdated knowledge	New funding opportunities. Expanding mission and instituting new projects. More collaboration with private sector, academia, NGOs. Opening new centers.	Similar to other NGOs in Zagreb and other parts of Croatia in that LET must compete for funds. Decreased interest among donors. Political instability. Deteriorating

NGO	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
	infrastructure. Good relations with donors. Cooperation with other organizations. High visibility. Client-oriented.	and lack of skills in new areas (legislation and communication skills). Poor communication between staff. Nowhere to counsel--office too small.	Idenitfying new staff. More visibility. New training can better equip staff.	economic situation. Not ready for EU funding. Staff depart for better-paying jobs.
Terra (Rejika, Croatia)	Clearly defined mission. Professional leadership, open and willing to learn. Well-trained, motivated team. Open, flexible, good team dynamics. Established procedures. Pioneers in field.	Insufficient community recognition. Staff burnout, heavy workload. Lack of skills and current knowledge. Underdeveloped policies and procedures. Funding uncertainity. Do not trust media.	Policy champions (mayor, chief of police). Recognition by Rijeka. Growing local financial support and recognition of need to fund these types of services. Growing economy. Good cooperation with public sector. Enthusiastic volunteers. Good media coverage of NGOs.	Political turnover, uncertainty of new leaders' perspective. Future uncertainty from other key stakeholders such as donors, church. Downturn in economy. NGOs not recognized by government. Media not reporting accurately.

ANNEX C: SUMMARY OF NGO ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT

		Panacea	IfHF	DoL	XY	LET	Terra	Number of Yes's
Reward and Recognition Does the NGO recognize and reward performance? Do employees feel valued? Is a performance evaluation system in place? Are salaries and bonuses linked to performance?	Opportunity?	YES	YES	YES	YES		YES	5
	Strength?					YES	YES	2
Decision Making Are decisions based on data and sufficient information? Do employees have sufficient authority to perform their jobs? Are employees appropriately involved in decisions that affect their work?	Opportunity?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		5
	Strength?			YES	YES		YES	3
Information Is critical business information communicated on a timely basis to employees who need it? Do employees have all the information they need to perform their jobs?	Opportunity?	YES	YES				YES	3
	Strength?			YES	YES	YES		3
Work Design Do employees know their responsibilities? Does work challenge and satisfy employees? Do employees work against clearly defined and aligned objectives and strategies?	Opportunity?	YES	YES			YES	YES	4
	Strength?	YES		YES	YES		YES	4
People Do managers provide support and coaching? Do employees receive the training and knowledge they need to perform their jobs? Do employees believe that colleagues have the skills and knowledge needed to perform their jobs?	Opportunity?	YES		YES	YES	YES		4
	Strength?		YES	YES	YES		YES	4

		Panacea	**IfHF**	**DoL**	**XY**	**LET**	**Terra**	**Number of Yes's**
Organizational Structure Are resources sufficient for employees to perform their jobs? Are roles and responsibilities clearly defined, communicated, and understood? Do employees understand how each department contributes to overall organizational objectives?	Opportunity?	YES		YES	YES		YES	4
	Strength?		YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	5

ANNEX D: SUMMARY OF PERSON-DAYS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

	Person-Days of Technical Assistance
1. <u>Sustainability Planning</u> *Strategic Planning*	
▪ One-day workshop with six representatives from six NGOs	6
▪ Four in-country consultancies with four NGOs for two to six months each	79
Revenue Diversification Planning	
▪ Four-day workshop with 10 representatives from six NGOs on fundraising and community outreach skills, including advocacy and public relations	40
▪ Half-day workshop with six representatives from six NGOs	3
▪ One-day in-country consultancy with one NGO to create a plan for fee-for-service scheme	21
Financial Planning and Budgeting	
▪ One-day workshop with six representatives from six NGOs	6
2. <u>Managing Performance in Others</u> *Team Dynamics*	
▪ Half-day workshop with six representatives from six NGOs	3
Providing Informal Feedback	
▪ One-day workshop with six representatives from six NGOs	6
▪ Six one-day workshops with 46 representatives from six NGOs	46
Providing Formal Feedback	
▪ Design of four performance evaluation systems	3
TOTAL PERSON-DAYS	213

ANNEX E: PROJECT EVALUATION MATRIX

Project Component	Purpose	Outputs	Indicator	Data Source/Method of Data Collection
Gatekeeper Reach Dose of Love, Bulgaria; IfHF, Bulgaria; Terra, Croatia; LET, Croatia	NGOs use Gatekeeper Reach model to extend their reach to the target population *(Improve Opportunity factors related to behavior of target groups)*	Gatekeeper Reach model has been effectively implemented	Number of gatekeepers trained per NGO	Reports from NGOs Follow-up visits and monthly calls
			Number of new clients registered by type and by any given gatekeeper by NGO	
			Average number of client contacts per month by type	
			Number of unique clients per month by type and by any given gatekeeper by NGO	
Gatekeeper Effectiveness Panacea, Bulgaria; XY, Bosnia and Herzegovina	NGOs use Gatekeeper Effectiveness model to increase their influence over the target population *(Improve Ability and Motivational factors related to behavior of target groups)*	Gatekeeper Effectiveness model has been effectively implemented	Pre-/post-training tests of gatekeepers Number of gatekeepers who successfully completed the assigned number of conversations following training Evidence directly from gatekeepers on changes in behavior among those with whom they interact	Pre-/post-test survey results Supervisory reports Supervisory reports using checklist of key questions for effectiveness model; gatekeeper reports
Capacity Building All	Improve organizational capacity of local NGOs	Baseline of NGOs' capacity completed	N/A	NGO proposal analysis (SWOTs)
		NGOs trained in financial planning, budget management, and reporting	Number of NGO staff trained in how to cost and budget programs Number of NGOs that completed new financial analysis on total organizational costs and projected needs NGOs' demonstrated capacity to use new skills	Reports from NGOs/follow-up visits Follow-up visits
		NGOs trained in long-term organizational planning	Long-term goals and strategies for each NGO well defined and feasible Medium- and long-term goals for each NGO in line with financial projections and donor proposals	Reports from NGOs/follow-up visits and monthly calls

Project Component	Purpose	Outputs	Indicator	Data Source/Method of Data Collection
		NGOs' strategic plan, mission, and vision updated	NGOs' revised strategic plan, mission, and vision that better defines them and better positions them for donor support Number of NGO staff who spontaneously understand organization's goals and strategies	Reports from NGOs/follow-up visits and monthly calls
		NGOs' management of external environment strengthened	Number of NGOs with feasible funding action plan NGOs have taken steps toward making new donor contacts NGOs' community and political ties strengthened Number of NGO staff who underwent public relations and advocacy skills training	Reports from NGOs/follow-up visits and monthly calls
		NGOs' internal management improved	Increased ability of NGO leadership/management to recognize strengths and weaknesses in capacity Increased capacity of NGO leadership/management to motivate improved staff performance	In-depth interviews with NGO management and staff

ANNEX F: SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT

	Indicator	Panacea	IfHF	DoL	XY	LET	Terra	Total
Financial Planning	Number of NGO staff trained in how to cost and budget programs	I	I	I	I	I	I	6
	Number of NGOs that completed new financial analysis on organizational costs and needs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	5 YES's
	NGOs' demonstrated capacity to use new skills	YES = In financial reporting	YES = In above strategic plan analysis	YES = In above strategic plan analysis	YES = In above strategic plan analysis	YES = In above strategic plan analysis	YES = In financial reporting	6 YES's
Long-Term Planning and Updated Plans	Existence of strategic plan*	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	6 YES's
	Existence of clear mission and vision statements	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	6 YES's
	Organizationally based rather than programmatic goals*	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	6 YES's
	Well-defined, realistic goals that have been costed out and are affordable	No; strategic plan goals too ambitious, but operational plan much less so	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	6 YES's
	Stragetic plan uses SMART objectives*	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	5 YES's
	Stratetic plan includes an operational plan for at least one year*	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	5 YES's
	Staff has internalized stratetic plan	'	YES = Majority of interviewed staff can explain strategic plan in own words	YES = Majority of interviewed staff can explain strategic plan in own words	YES = Majority of interviewed staff can explain strategic plan in own words	NO/YES = Outreach workers have difficulty explaining strategic plan, rest of staff can easily explain plan	YES = Majority of interviewed staff can explain strategic plan in own words	4.5 YES's
	Strategic plan includes financial sustainability as a goal*	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	6 YES's
	Strategic plan includes organizational development as a goal*	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	6 YES's

* Indicator is in addition to the original matrix.

	Indicator	Panacea	IfHF	DoL	XY	LET	Terra	Total
Management of External Environment Strengthened	Existence of specific strategies for revenue diversification (i.e., Funding Action Plan)	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	6 YES's
	Strategies judged to be realistic and obtainable*	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	4 YES's
	Active pursuit of income generation schemes*	NO	Y ES= In a way that requires no new skills/ activities (implementing research studies)	YES = In a significant way, operating a small business	NO	YES= In a way that requires no new skills/ activities (organizing conferences, consulting NGOs)	YES = In a significant way, charging clients for counseling services	4 YES's
	Meaningful steps with 2006 applications to new donors	1: applied to and is waiting	1: approached 1: applied to and won 1: applied to and was rejected	1: approached 1: applied to and is waiting	3: applied and is waiting	4: applied and is waiting 3: applied and won	1: applied and is waiting 1: approached	N/A
	Examples of strengthened community and political ties during 2006	Worked closely with local government during hepatitis breakout	Received space for a drop-in shelter in Roma quarter	Successfully lobbied Ministry of Health to pressure the city's testing center to accommodate MARP clients	Conducted regular advocacy activities as part of another project	Won support from State Office for NGOs to plan the 2007 Nationall Addictions Conference	Won financial support from county government for first time	N/A
	Number of NGO staff trained in public relations and advocacy skills	2	2	2	2	1	1	10

* Indicator is in addition to the original matrix.

	Indicator	Panacea	IfHF	DoL	XY	LET	Terra	Total
NGO Internal Management Improved	Management understands importance of sustainability planning*	YES/NO = Understands, but leadership is lacking from executive director	YES = Did not before RiskNet2, but now does	YES = But did before RiskNet2	YES = Understands, though does only what is required by donors	YES = Did not before RiskNet2, but now does	YES = But did before RiskNet2	5.5 YES's (with one qualification)
	Ability of NGO management to recognize strengths and weaknesses	*(Technical assistance focused on strength. Weaknesses, opportunities, and threats directly related to sustainability. See instead next two indicators.)*						N/A
	Remaining key management challenge*	Strategically focused (i.e., follow strategic plan) and apply to new donors	Executing strategic plan	Starting and running for-profit business	Begin moving toward some type of cost-recovery scheme	Executing strategic plan	Implement fee-for- service scheme	N/A
	Management judged to understand the challenge and is taking steps toward meeting it*	YES/NO = NGO is using own funds to be trained on project design/ proposal writing**	YES = NGO is using own funds for further consultation on plan implementation	YES = RiskNet2 awarded a grant for purchase of start-up equipment	NO = Management is relying on external funding for foreseeable future	YES = Implementation has already begun	YES = RiskNet2 provided a consultancy for development of plan	4.5 YES's
	Increased capacity of management to motivate and manage staff	*(Project team felt that staff and management answers were overly influenced by what respondents thought the project team wanted to hear. Instead, see next two indicators.)*						N/A
	Quality of feedback has improved and is actionable*	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	6 YES's
	Feedback used regularly by management and staff to manage performance*	No = Feedback is not used proactively to manage performance, but instead used reactively to resolve problems		YES	NO = Feedback is not used proactively to manage performance, but instead used reactively to resolve problems			1 YES

*Indicator is in addition to the original matrix.

** Panacea is awarded a Y/N for this indicator because executive will for this action appears to be split.

ANNEX G: SUMMARY OF NGO SUSTAINABILITY

NGO	Understands Importance of Strategic Sustainability Planning?	Key Outcome of Sustainability Component	Remaining Key Management Challenge	Urgency of Challenge	Prediction of Medium-Term Survival
LET	Did not before RiskNet2, but now does	Strategic plan and realistic revenue diversification strategies	Executing plan	Normal	Strong
IfHF	Did not before RiskNet2, but now does	Strategic plan and realistic revenue diversification strategies	Executing plan	Normal	Strong
Terra	Yes, but did before RiskNet2	Legal, administrative, and financial plan for fee-for-service scheme	Implementing fee-for-service scheme and managing employee burnout	Normal	Strong
DoL	Yes, but did before RiskNet2	Grant to purchase start-up equipment for IGA	Starting and running for-profit business and securing more donors	Urgent	Strong
XY	Understands, though does only what is required by donors	Educated about alternative funding schemes	Begin moving toward some type of cost- recovery scheme	Normal	Strong because of donor conditions
Panacea	Understands, but leadership lacking from executive director	Strategic plan and realistic Year 1 operational plan	Strategically focus NGO efforts (i.e., follow plan) and apply to new donors	Critical	Weak

ANNEX H: BIBLIOGRAPHY

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